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Abstract
In spite of two decades of financial globalization, consumption-based indicators do not seem to signal
more international risk sharing. We argue that the fraction of idiosyncratic consumption risk that gets
shared among industrialised countries has actually increased considerably over the period 1980-2000
and in particular during the 1990s - from around 30 to more than 60 percent. However, standard
consumption-based measures of risk sharing - such as the volatility of consumption conditional on
output or international consumption correlations - have been unable to detect this increase because
consumption has also been affected by the concurrent decline in the volatility of output growth in most
industrialised countries since the 1980s: first, the volatility of output at business cycle frequencies has
declined by more than has the volatility of permanent fluctuations. Since consumption reacts mainly to
permanent shocks, it appears more volatile in relation to current changes in output. This effect seems to
have offset the tendency of financial globalization to lower the volatility of consumption conditional on
output. Secondly, because the variability of permanent global shocks has also fallen, international
consumption correlations have also generally not increased as financial markets have become more
integrated.
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Abstract
In spite of two decades of nancial globalization, consumption-based indi-
cators do not seem to signal more international risk sharing. We argue
that the fraction of idiosyncratic consumption risk that gets shared among
industrialised countries has actually increased considerably over the period
1980-2000 and in particular during the 1990s from around 30 to more than
60 percent. However, standard consumption-based measures of risk sharing
 such as the volatility of consumption conditional on output or interna-
tional consumption correlations have been unable to detect this increase
because consumption has also been a¤ected by the concurrent decline in the
volatility of output growth in most industrialised countries since the 1980s:
rst, the volatility of output at business cycle frequencies has declined by
more than has the volatility of permanent uctuations. Since consumption
reacts mainly to permanent shocks, it appears more volatile in relation to
current changes in output. This e¤ect seems to have o¤set the tendency of
nancial globalization to lower the volatility of consumption conditional on
output. Secondly, because the variability of permanent global shocks has
also fallen, international consumption correlations have also generally not
increased as nancial markets have become more integrated.
Keywords: Consumption Risk Sharing, International Business Cycles,
Great Moderation, Financial Integration and Capital Flows, Home Bias
JEL classification: C23, E21, F36
1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the 1980s, international nancial markets have be-
come increasingly integrated. It would seem that this should unambiguously
lead to better international consumption risk sharing. But conventional
measures of international consumption risk sharing seem to be una¤ected
by more than two decades of nancial globalization and continue to display
low levels of nancial market integration. In this paper, we document that
the fraction of idiosyncratic shocks that gets shared among industrialised
countries has actually grown considerably during the globalization period 
from around 30 percent before 1980 to more than 60 percent in the 1990s.
The impact of nancial globalization on consumption-based measures of
risk sharing has, however, been blurred by the fact that the underlying risks
have changed as well: international business cycles have become much less
volatile.
The literature on consumption risk sharing falls into two broad strands.
The rst strand emphasizes that in complete nancial markets, marginal
utility growth should be equated across countries so that consumption growth
rates should be highly correlated. This correlation-based approach has en-
countered the now famous consumption correlation or quantity puzzle: in
the data the correlation in consumption is not only low (consistent with
low degrees of international risk sharing) but also generally lower than the
correlation in the underlying risks, i.e. output growth rates.(Backus, Kehoe
and Kydland (1992)).
A second strand of the empirical consumption risk sharing literature has
focused on regression-based measures. These studies (notably Asdrubali,
Sørensen and Yosha (1996), Sørensen and Yosha (1998) and Crucini (1999))
emphasize an alternative prediction of the complete markets model: uc-
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tuations in relative (i.e. idiosyncratic) marginal utility growth should be
independent of idiosyncratic risk (as measured by relative output growth
rates). Therefore, the coe¢ cient of a (panel-) regression of relative con-
sumption growth on relative output growth should be zero.1 Similar risk-
sharing regressions were rst proposed by Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991) and
Townsend (1991) as tests of the null of market completeness, but as argued
very convincingly by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) they are more
generally useful: since the estimated coe¢ cient is typically between zero and
one it can be interpreted as the fraction of risk that remains unshared: if
the coe¢ cient is unity, no risk is shared, if it is zero, all risk is shared.
Both risk sharing regressions as well as consumption correlations doc-
ument a lack of risk sharing in international relative to regional data, but
they do not seem to change very much over time. None of the papers
cited above detects a major increase in risk sharing in international data in
what we refer to as the globalization period, i.e. after 1980, even though
international capital ows as well as cross-holdings of equity and foreign di-
rect investment have seen spectacular growth (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2001, 2004)). Recently, Moser et al. (2003) have investigated risk sharing
regressions based on European data and concluded that consumption risk
sharing has not increased, neither since capital markets have been liberalized
nor since the move to a common currency. Based on a broad sample of 43
highly nancially integrated economies, Bai and Zhang (2005) do not nd a
signicant increase in consumption risk sharing either. Heathcote and Perri
(2004) even document a marked decrease in the correlation between U.S.
consumption and consumption in other industrialised economies. Labhard
1We use the term relativeinterchangeably to denote the idiosyncratic component of
a variable constructed.as the logarithmic di¤erence between a country-realization of that
variable and its crosssectional mean.
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and Sawicki (2006), using UK regional and international data, equally nd
a slight decrease in risk sharing based on a factor-analytical approach.
All these ndings could be taken as evidence that nancial integration
has not helped to facilitate international consumption risk sharing. In this
paper we argue that this interpretation is incorrect. In fact, consumption
risk sharing has increased but consumption-based measures of risk sharing
have mostly been unable to detect the impact of nancial globalization be-
cause of the concurrent decline in the volatility of output growth in most
industrialised countries.2
Specically, we argue that risk sharing regressions have not picked up
the e¤ect of nancial globalization because the short-term volatility of out-
put growth has dropped by more than has its long-term volatility, i.e. the
volatility of permanent uctuations. Since, as we show, consumption re-
acts primarily to permanent changes in relative output, the volatility of
relative consumption conditional on current relative output growth has not
decreased as nancial globalization has progressed. While most of our dis-
cussion centers on risk sharing regressions, we also show that consumption
growth correlations do not seem to have increased because the volatility of
the global component of permanent output shocks has decreased even more
sharply than has the volatility of their country-specic components.
We discuss the impact of these changes in the volatility of business cy-
cles in the framework of a permanent income model in which all transitory
uctuations in consumption can be smoothed but in which there is also
some partial, though incomplete, insurance against permanent idiosyncratic
2Since the rst version of our paper (Artis and Ho¤mann (2004)), a small number of
studies has started to nd similar indications that risk sharing might have increased with
nancial integration (see Bekaert et al. (2006) for emerging market economies following
liberalizations and Sørensen et al (2007) for the link between home bias and risk sharing),
but to date these remain exceptions (see also the excellent survey in Kose et al. (2007)).
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shocks. From a theoretical perspective, the distinction between permanent
and transitory uctuations in output and income is central, because it is
plausibly much harder for households, regions and entire countries to insure
against permanent rather than against transitory uctuations: Insurance
against permanent shocks requires ex-ante diversication which is generally
only possible through state-contingent assets such as equity, whereas tran-
sitory variation in income can also be smoothed ex-post through borrowing
and lending.3
Our empirical results are based on data from 22 OECD countries span-
ning the period 1960-2000. For the sake of comparison, we also obtain
results for U.S. state level data for the period 1960-90. As is suggested
by our theoretical framework, we account separately for permanent (trend
growth) and transitory (purely cyclical) variation in country-specic output
growth. We rst conrm that transitory shocks have indeed little or no im-
pact on consumption, whereas insurance against permanent shocks is much
less complete, very much as the permanent income model with partial insur-
ance would suggest. Most importantly, however, we detect a considerable
increase in the degree of international risk sharing during the globalization
period  i.e. during the 1980s, and even more so during the 1990s. This
increase is associated mainly with a better diversication of permanent risk.
The reason why this e¤ect, which is most likely the result of nancial glob-
alization4, has not been picked up by conventional risk sharing regressions
3Markets for state contingent assets are more likely to be subject to frictions and
market incompleteness than are markets for non-state contingent assets such as bonds or
loans. State-contingent assets will only exist to the extent that the state of the world, on
which they are contingent, is not too costly to verify. As pointed out in e.g. Kocherlakota
(1996), problems of moral hazard or enforceability are particularly likely to arise in such
markets which may render them endogenously incomplete.
4This increase in risk sharing is indeed closely linked with the growth in international
asset positions (see our companion paper Artis and Ho¤mann (2007) and also Sørensen,
Wu, Yosha and Zhu (2007)).
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is that the marked moderation in the volatility of output vis-à-vis the pre-
globalization era has lowered the volatility of business cycles by more than
it has the volatility of innovations in permanent output. We argue that this
pattern of decline in volatility indicates a more gradual adjustment of output
to permanent idiosyncratic shocks: for a permanent shock of a given size,
output today reacts less strongly. Since consumption adjusts directly to the
shock in permanent income, it therefore appears more volatile in relation to
current output. This instance of Deatons (1992) paradox can explain why
the risk sharing regression underestimates the true, considerably increased,
extent of international risk sharing.
Our results tie in with a recent theoretical and empirical literature that
emphasizes that nancial globalization may in itself have important e¤ects
on international business cycles. In particular, they are in line with the ob-
servation that international business cycles have become more synchronized
over the last two decades and that business cycle volatility has decreased
globally  a phenomoneon often referred to as the great moderation (see
McConnel and Perez Quiros (2000), Kose et al. (2003, 2005), Bordo and
Helbling (2004) and Stock and Watson (2005)). Our paper is also related to
the work of Imbs (2006) who provides cross sectional evidence that nancial
integration seems to lead to more business cycle symmetry and that it may
increase risk sharing. But Imbs also acknowledges that the consumption
correlation puzzle does not seem to vanish and that changes in consumption
based measures of international risk sharing over time are notoriously hard
to detect. Our results suggest a solution to this puzzle.
Our framework and empirical ndings also bear some interesting sim-
ilarities to a recent micro-labour literature that emphasizes the distinc-
tion between permanent and transitory shocks for understanding household
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level consumption inequality. Notably, Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante
(2007) obtain closed-form solutions to an incomplete markets model that can
serve as an analytical framework in which any degree of partial insurance
can be allowed for. Based on a similar line of argument as we have used here,
Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2006) show that household consumption
inequality in the U.S. has not increased in line with income inequality mainly
because the relative contribution of transitory shocks to income inequality
has increased and because it is easier for households to obtain insurance
against the transitory part of their idiosyncratic risk.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in section two we
discuss both the regression- and correlation-based approaches to the mea-
surement of consumption risk sharing. Section three lays out the theoretical
framework of the partial insurance model based on which we then propose
a decomposition of the conventional risk sharing coe¢ cient into one com-
ponent that captures the dynamic adjustment of output to shocks and a
(business cycle-) adjusted measure of risk sharing. In section four we present
our data and the details of the empirical implementation. Section ve o¤ers
a discussion of our main results. While we nd it useful to discuss most
results in this paper based on a regression-based approach, this section also
applies our framework to the analysis of consumption correlations. Section
six concludes.
2 Consumption-based measures of risk sharing
The consumption-based measures of risk sharing that we consider in this
paper and that are most used in the literature are motivated by a benchmark
model with complete nancial markets and frictionless trade in goods. In
such a model, marginal utility growth in country or region k equals the
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growth in the shadow price of consumption and is therefore equalized across
countries:
u0k(C
k
t+1)
u0k(C
k
t )
=
t+1
t
, (1)
where u0(:) is the period utility function and Ckt measures consumption in
country k. The shadow price of consumption is t. There are two related
readings of this fundamental equation that have both found their reec-
tions in the empirical literature. The rst is that marginal utility growth
should be perfectly correlated across countries. One branch of the literature
therefore looks at consumption correlations. This line of research has en-
countered the now famous consumption correlation puzzle (Backus, Kehoe,
Kydland (1992)), the stylized fact that international consumption correla-
tions are lower than the corresponding output correlations. Stockman and
Tesar (1995) have argued that consumption is likely to be driven by pref-
erence shocks and subject to considerable measurement error so that low
empirical consumption correlations could in principle arise even in complete
markets. This can make it di¢ cult to interpret consumption correlations as
measures of risk sharing.
Our main focus in this paper will therefore be on an alternative reading
of equation (1) that has equally made a profound impact on the risk sharing
literature: since growth in the shadow price is common to all countries,
the di¤erence between marginal utility growth in two countries, while not
necessarily zero, should be statistically independent of the country-specic
risk-variables, notably relative endowments.
In order to obtain an estimable equation, specic assumptions on the
form of the utility function are typically made. Under logarithmic utility,
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the optimality condition can be written
E
h
ckt  ct jXkt
i
= 0,
where Xkt is a vector of time-varying country characteristics that capture
idiosyncratic risk, such as relative output growth; lower case letters denote
logarithms, so that ckt is the growth rate of consumption in country k. The
asterisk denotes foreign (world average) variables.
Under full insurance, the regression
ckt  ct = b0Xkt + "t
should yield a coe¢ cient of zero.5
Unlike consumption correlations, the regression-based formulation of the
test for full risk sharing allows consumption to be a¤ected by a host of unob-
served factors, such as measurement error and preference shocks. Provided
these factors are uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic risk characteristics Xkt ,
they should just be captured by the regression residual.
Clearly, Xkt could itself be correlated with relative consumption growth
for reasons that are unrelated to nancial market incompleteness. For exam-
ple, non-separabilities in utility between consumption and leisure will render
income and consumption endogenous and correlated. However, one of the
central messages of the international real business cycle literature (notably
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992)) is that the substitution e¤ect between
consumption and leisure can at best account for a very limited degree of
comovement in relative consumption and output at the aggregate level. An-
5Mace (1991) and Cochrane (1991) were the rst authors to investigate regression of
this type in household-level data.
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other instance in which one might expect a correlation between Xkt and
relative consumption is if Xkt is related to relative movements in consump-
tion price levels. The rst order condition (1) assumes that all countries
consume the same bundle of goods and that these goods are freely traded so
that consumption price levels equalize. If this is not the case, then complete
risk sharing implies a high correlation between relative consumption and
the real exchange rate (Backus and Smith (1993)). Here, we disregard the
role of real exchange rate uctuations6 and follow the bulk of the literature
that has treated Xkt , notably relative output, as exogenous in the empirical
analysis. Specically, most researchers, including Asdrubali, Sørensen and
Yosha (1996) and Crucini (1999) have formulated regressions of the form
ckt  ct = b
h
ykt  y
i
+ "t, (2)
where yk is the logarithm of output in country k and the asterisk, again,
denotes the world average. We call this equation the basic risk sharing
regression. Clearly, in models with complete markets (and against the back-
drop of the qualications given above) the coe¢ cient estimate of b should be
zero or close to zero. Real world nancial markets are likely to be incomplete
and panel estimates of b are typically between zero and one. This has led
researchers, notably, Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996), to interpret b
as a measure of risk sharing that indicates the fraction of idiosyncratic risk
that remains unshared. Based on US state level data, Asdrubali, Sørensen
and Yosha nd that b is around 0:25, which suggests that roughly a quarter
6Ho¤mann (2008) reports that deviations from purchasing power parity can indeed
account for a substantial fraction of the comovement between relative consumption and
relative output. But he also shows that the conclusions as to how much risk is shared
through nancial markets remain una¤ected by controlling for real exchange rate move-
ments. It therefore seems an acceptable simplication to abstract from the role of exchange
rate movements in answering our basic question here: why has risk sharing not increased
as nancial portfolios have become more globalized?
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of idiosyncratic output uctuations remain uninsured. Based on data from
OECD countries, Sørensen and Yosha (1998) nd more than 70 percent of
idiosyncratic uctuations appear to remain uninsured. Hence, according to
this measure, there is a lack of international consumption risk sharing when
risk sharing within countries is taken as the benchmark.
What is puzzling, however, is that in spite of the recent wave of nancial
globalization, regressions of the form (2) do not seem to indicate an increase
in international risk sharing the coe¢ cient b does not seem to decline. We
argue next that international business cycles have changed in a way that
has o¤set the tendency of b to decline with better nancial integration.
3 A permanent income model with partial insur-
ance
We use a simple theoretical framework inspired by Crucini (1999) in which
we assume that a country can obtain insurance against permanent (idiosyn-
cratic) uctuations in its income by buying into a world mutual fund that
pays world average output as a dividend. Therefore, income growth is a
weighted sum of domestic and world average output growth:
inckt = (1  !)ykt + !yt .
Here, ! measures the fraction of country ks wealth held in the mutual
fund. This measure of diversication is our index of nancial globalization.
We further assume that, once income is observed, the country can fully
smooth the e¤ect of any transitory uctuations in consumption through
borrowing and lending so that
10
ckt = inc
kP
t = (1  !)ykPt + !yPt , (3)
where the superscript Pdenotes the permanent component.
Acknowledging that for the world as whole it must be that c =
incP = yP , we can rewrite equation (3) as
ckt  ct = (1  !)
h
ykPt  yPt
i
. (4)
If ! = 0, then there is no international diversication and the country ob-
tains no insurance against permanent idiosyncratic output shocks, whereas
if ! = 1, insurance against such shocks will be complete. In general, we
should expect ! to be between 0 and 1, implying what we call imperfect risk
sharing or partial consumption insurance.
This model highlights that it is important to distinguish between per-
manent and transitory uctuations in the empirical measurement of risk
sharing. First, equation (4) would suggest a regression of relative output
growth rates on relative growth rates in permanent output:
ckt  ct = bP

yPt  yPt

+ t (5)
and under the null of our model, bP = (1   !). Secondly, the coe¢ cient
bT in the regression
ckt  ct = bT

yTt  yTt

+ vt, (6)
where yT = y yP , should equal zero - transitory variation in relative
outputs should not have an impact on relative consumption. For empirical
purposes, requiring that bT is zero may be too strict a condition to impose.
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After all, our theoretical assumption that transitory uctuations can ac-
tually be smoothed away completely whereas insurance against permanent
shocks is generally incomplete is just a metaphor for saying that existing
nancial markets make it harder for countries to insure against permanent
shocks than against transitory uctuations. Our empirical analysis specif-
ically allows for the possibility that bT is di¤erent from zero, for example
because a fraction of consumers faces borrowing constraints. But our expec-
tation would be that bp = (1 !) > bT a conjecture we nd conrmed in
the data.
We consider bP and bT to be the structuralrisk sharing coe¢ cients.7
As we show next, the coe¢ cient of the basic risk sharing regression (2), b,
can be interpreted as a reduced form that is not only a function of these
structural coe¢ cients bP and bT , but also of what we call the structure of
business cycles: the respective contributions of permanent and transitory
uctuations to the volatility of output.
3.1 Link to the basic risk sharing regression
In the remainder of the paper we economize on notation and let the hat
denote relative growth rates of a variable. In addition, whenever possible
without ambiguity, we drop the time subscript t so that bc = c c and
by = y y. Then the regression coe¢ cient b of the baseline risk sharing
regression is
7Specically, we interpret bP and bT as the fraction of permanent and transitory vari-
ation in output that systematically spills over into consumption. Since we do not require
permanent and transitory components of output to be orthogonal, we note that it would
not generally be possible to give the same simple interpretation to the coe¢ cients of a
multiple regression for consumption that includes permanent and transitory components
of output growth at the same time.
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b =
cov(bc; by)
var(by) = cov(bc; byP ) + cov(bc; byT )var(by) ,
whereas the two structural risk sharing coe¢ cients from (5) and (6) are
given by
bP =
cov(bc; byP )
var(byP ) and bT = cov(bc; byT )var(byT ) .
We can then write
b = bP
var(byP )
var(by) + bT var(byT )var(by) . (7)
This equation allows us to infer that a drop in the structural risk shar-
ing coe¢ cients can be o¤set by changes in the ratios var(byP )=var(by) and
var(byT )=var(by). In the data, we nd that bT is generally close to zero, quite
in line with our model of partial insurance. In our discussion of the impact
of changes in business cycle volatility on b, we therefore nd it useful to im-
pose the restrictions from our model, specically bT = 0 and bP = (1  !).
This simplies (7) to
b = (1  !), (8)
where  = var(byP )=var(by) is the share of permanent uctuations in the
variance of country-specic output growth. We call  the long-term variance
ratio.
The decomposition (8) allows us to identify the sources of variation in
b over time. Based on international data, we document that ! has actually
increased  risk sharing has actually improved a lot but an increase in 
has o¤set the impact of better international diversication on b.
We suggest that  should be interpreted as an indicator of the pattern
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of dynamic adjustment following a country-specic shock to the permanent
component of (relative) output. This is most easily demonstrated in the
context of an AR(1) process for country-specic output growth. Let byt =
dyt 1 + "t and var("t) = 2. Then the permanent component of a shock "t
is "Pt = (1  ) 1"t and var("Pt )=var("t) = 1=(1  2). An increase in  will
increase the long-term variance ratio  and is associated with a more sluggish
and gradual adjustment of output to its new long-run level. This example is
empirically relevant: in the AR(1)-specication for country-specic output
growth that we estimate below, the estimate of  rises from close to zero
before 1980 to around 0:3 during the globalization period.
We further illustrate our interpretation of  in gures 1 and 2. In both
gures there is a shock to permanent output byP of the same size. In both
cases, relative consumption will therefore immediately adjust to its new
permanent level so that bc = (1 !)byP . However, in gure 1, the adjustment
of output to the permanent shock is immediate, so that by = byP , whereas
in gure 2 output adjusts only gradually to its new long-run level, so that
by < byP . In the rst case, we have  = 1 and the regression of bc on by will
correctly identify the degree of risk sharing, (1   !). In the second gure
though, since by < byP , consumption will actually appear excessively volatile
relative to current output because it fully reacts to the permanent shock on
impact, whereas current output follows suit only over time. Hence we have
bc = (1   !)byP = (1   !)by with  > 1. This instance of Deatons (1992)
paradox causes the basic risk sharing regression to underestimate !. But
note that this un-smoothing of consumption is an optimal response of the
consumer to the permanent shock, not a failure to share consumption risk.8
8Since it is not empirically relevant in our data set and in order to save on space, the
gure does not provide the third case in which  < 1 so that current output changes
exceed the long-run changes. In analogy to case 2, this would lead us to overestimate risk
sharing.
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We nd that the increase in  is directly linked to the general decrease
in business cycle volatility over the 1980s and 1990s. In our data, both
var(byP ) and var(by) have decreased, but the variability at the business cyclce
frequency, var(by), has actually fallen more than has var(byP ). It is not the
aim of this paper to explore the economic causes of changes in business cycle
volatility. But the interpretation of  that we have proposed here shows that
our results are in in line with many studies in the area in indicating that
shocks to output have not only become less volatile but that the response
of output to these shocks seems to have become more gradual. Possibly
this is the reection of better macroeconomic management and a generally
increased resilience of advanced economies to idiosyncratic shocks.
4 Econometric implementation
4.1 Constructing permanent components
Estimating our set of risk sharing regressions (5) and (6) involves the identi-
cation of a permanent component of domestic and foreign output growth.
We construct this as the change in the annuity-value of domestic or foreign
output according to
Y Pt = (1 R)
1X
k=0
RkE (Yt+k) , (9)
where R = (1 + r) 1 and r is the world real interest rate. In the appendix,
we derive the following approximation for the logarithm of Y Pt :
yPt = log

Y Pt
  yt + 1X
k=1
RkE (yt+k) = (1 R)
1X
k=1
RkE (yt+k) . (10)
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Once we specify processes for yt and yto proxy for the expectations
involved in (10) we can then obtain byPt = yPt  yPt and byTt .
We follow Crucini (1999) and consider several di¤erent specications for
the stochastic processes driving y and y: in the rst, home and foreign
output follow separate AR(1) processes whereas in the second, home and
foreign output and consumption follow a VAR. We then use the estimated
processes to compute the expectations involved in the construction of yP
and yP in (10).
We describe the construction of these permanent values in the appendix.
We also performed a battery of robustness checks on our identication of
permanent components. Specically, we experimented with values of r be-
tween 0 and 0:1 and we also let r vary across countries to reect the e¤ects
of limited nancial integration. Our ndings turned out to be extremely
robust. In the remainder of the paper, we present results that are based on
the same value of r = 0:02 for all countries and regions.
The permanent-transitory decompositions in the spirit of Beveridge and
Nelson (1981) as we have just described them give us a permanent compo-
nent Y P that is virtually a random walk, irrespective of what the driving
process for Yt is.9 This feature of Beveridge-Nelson-type decompositions is
central for our analysis: in theory, what should matter for consumption dy-
namics are unpredictable movements in the trend. This is the reason why
in a permanent-income setting, permanent and transitory uctuations in in-
come are qualitatively di¤erent with respect to their degree of insurability:
ultimately, permanent uctuations in output cannot be smoothed through
borrowing and lending and therefore have to be insured through more so-
9Note that in the case r = 0, that we consider in the range of possible values for the
discount factor, we obtain exactly the Beveridge-Nelson permanent component.
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phisticated assets such as equity.10 We therefore restrict our analysis here
to trend-cycle decompositions that are directly derived from and consistent
with the underlying economic theory.11
4.2 Data and estimation
We use annual data from the Penn World Table, release 6.1 (PWT 6.1.) by
Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). The sample ranges from 1960 to 2000.
All data are in constant (1996) international prices. The countries included
in our estimation are:
1. Canada, 2. the United States, 3. Japan, 4. Austria, 5. Belgium,
6. Denmark , 7. Finland, 8. France, 9. Germany (West), 10. Greece, 11.
Iceland, 12. Ireland, 13. Italy, 14. Netherlands, 15. Norway, 16. Portugal,
17. Spain, 18. Sweden, 19. Switzerland, 20. United Kingdom, 21. Australia,
22. New Zealand. Most of these countries are OECD countries and we will
refer to them under this label.
Our main interest here is in using our decomposition of the basic risk
sharing coe¢ cient to understand how the measurement of risk sharing is
a¤ected over time. However, one might also want to ask to what extent
di¤erences in the structure of international and regional business cycles (as
captured by di¤erences in ) can account for why there is an apparent lack
of risk sharing among countries relative to regions within a country. By way
of comparison, we therefore also apply our analysis to the U.S. state level
data set used in the study by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996)12. This
10See e.g. Baxter and Crucini (1995) who show that the dynamic properties of bonds-
only and complete markets economies are di¤erent only for very persistent shock processes.
11Specically, we do not apply a battery of purely statistical ltering methods. For
example, the permanent component obtained from an HP-lter is smooth for standard
parameter values and this smoothness implies a high degree of predictability. Therefore
changes in the HP permanent component will not generally correspond closely to changes
in the theoretically relevant permanent component which is the annuity value of output.
12The data base is available at Oved Yoshas web page
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data set ranges from 1960-90.
For the international data set we report results for three subperiods: the
rst covers the period 1960-1980, the second covers 1980-2000. Finally, we
also look at the 1990s alone. There are a number of reasons for choosing
these particular sub-periods. First, the 1980s saw the major liberalization
of capital markets and we therefore refer to the post-1980 part of our sam-
ple as the globalization period. Secondly, reporting separate results for
the 1990s alone will provide insights into the e¤ects on risk sharing of the
dramatic increase in net international asset positions that started to take
place from the early 1990s onwards (compare e.g. the data in Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2001)). Third, the sample split after 1980 is also justied on
the grounds that the properties of international business cycles have started
to change dramatically in the 1980s, a phenomenon often referred to as the
great moderation.13
We estimated all risk sharing regressions with a panel two-stage least
squares procedure. First, we removed country-specic xed e¤ects. Then
we estimate the panel by OLS. To control for heteroskedasticity, all variables
are then weighted by the country-specic variance of the rst stage residuals
and the model is re-estimated.
http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/riskshare/channels/channels.htm
We do not describe the data here since it is described in detail in the orginal article as
well as in Becker and Ho¤mann (2006) and a previous version of this paper (Artis and
Ho¤mann (2004)).
13We also obtained results for the period 1960-90, because this is the period covered in
the inuential studes by Sørensen and Yosha (1998) and Crucini (1999) and in the U.S.
data set by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996). We do not report these results though,
since they are qualitatively very similar to those obtained for the 1960-80 period.
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5 Empirical results
The rst line in table 1 provides the results of basic risk sharing regressions
for both U.S. and international data. Roughly three quarters of idiosyncratic
output variability remains uninsured in country-level data, in the later pe-
riod (1980-2000), more than 80 percent. Only 15 percent of idiosyncratic
variability spills over into consumption according to the results obtained
from U.S. state level data.
Our basic risk sharing regressions clearly reect the general pattern in
the literature: rst, according to b, there is a lot more risk sharing in regional
data than there is in country-level data, but even at the regional or state
level, risk sharing is not complete. Secondly, in international data the esti-
mate of b does not seem to decline. For the period 1980-2000 it is actually
higher than that obtained for the earlier period. The point estimate for the
1990s is marginally lower, but still higher than for the 1960-80 period and
not signicantly di¤erent from that for the entire 1980-2000 period. From
these estimates it is clear that the e¤ects of nancial globalization do not
seem to work through to the risk sharing regression.
These results constitute our point of reference. We will refer back to
table 1 as the results of the baseline specication, or equivalently, of the
basic risk sharing regression. We now turn to dissecting these results.
5.1 Insurance of permanent and transitory shocks
In table 2 we present the results from the risk sharing regressions on perma-
nent and transitory output variation. In U.S. data we nd that only 5-15
percent of permanent variability remain uninsured. A similar value obtains
for transitory uctuations. Hence, in U.S. data we cannot nd evidence that
there is a qualitative di¤erence between permanent and transitory shocks to
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output in so far as their degree of insurability is concerned.14
The picture changes quite substantially once we turn to the regression
with international data. While OECD countries also seem to be able to
smooth transitory variation almost completely, at least in the later sub-
periods, the coe¢ cient bP on permanent output variation tells us that in
1960-80 almost 60 percent of permanent idiosyncratic output variability re-
mained uninsured at the international level. But this coe¢ cient has come
down quite markedly over time. In the period 1980-2000 it is 0:43 (0:42 for
the AR) already considerably lower than for the 1960-80 period even though
the di¤erence is only marginally signicant. In the 1990s there is a further
dramatic drop that is now also clearly signicant vis-à-vis the 1960-80 pe-
riod.
While there is still a lot less insurance at the international than at the
regional level, the results here are indicative of a substantial increase in
international consumption risk sharing over the globalization period. The
baseline regression does not seem to pick this up.
5.2 E¤ects of business cycle structure
Table 3 sheds light on why the coe¢ cient b seems una¤ected by nancial
globalization.
As is apparent from the rst colums, the volatility of the country-specic
component of business cycles, var(by), has fallen considerably over the three
sub-periods.15 Since we can also write var(by) = var(y) 2cov(y;y)+
14This result is in line with earlier ndings by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996)
who document that idiosyncratic persistence does not seem to have a big e¤ect on the
overall extent of insurance in U.S. data but that regions with more persistent idiosyncratic
uctuations rather tend to insure ex-ante.
15We calculate the variances var(by), var(byP ) and var(byT ) as the cross-country average
of the variances of the respective variable, so that e.g. var(by) = 1
K
PK
k=1 var(bytk) and
var(bykt ) is the time-series variance of by for country k.
20
var(y), this is in line with the observation made by many authors that
international business cycles have both become less volatile and more syn-
chronized.16 Our estimates for var(byP ), reported in the second column, show
that this decrease in idiosyncratic volatility is also associated with a marked
drop in the volatility of the permanent idiosyncratic component in output
growth. But though var(byP ) has also decreased quite substantially, var(by)
has fallen by more, as is reected by the marked growth of the long-term
variance ratio  reported in the third column.17
In column 4 we report what we call the business-cycle adjusted risk
sharing coe¢ cient
badj = b=, (11)
which is the baseline risk sharing coe¢ cient from table 1 normalized by the
long-run variance ratio. It is readily apparent that
badj = bP + bT
var(byT )
var(byP ) = (1  !) + bT var(byT )var(byP ) .
We think about badj as a compound measure of risk sharing that explicitly
allows for the possibility that both consumption insurance and consumption
smoothing could be imperfect, so that bP = (1 !) and bT are both positive.
Since bT
var(byT )
var(byP )  0 , the di¤erence badj   bP will be positive and increasing
in the importance of transitory relative to permanent variation in country-
specic output. In the data, we have found that bT is reasonably small and
16See Perez, Osborn and Artis (2006) for a recent contribution in this mould and the
references cited there for a more comprehensive survey of the literature.
17According to the intuition we provided in Figure 1 and 2, an increase in  indicates
a more gradual response of output to country-specic shocks. This interpretation is sup-
ported through some simple empirical evidence: based on the AR(1) specications used
in Table 2, idiosyncractic output growth can be written as byt = byt 1 yt 1+"t where
 and  are the AR(1) coe¢ cients on yt and y respectively and  = (   ). For
the average country the estimate of  in the pre-1980 period is close to zero, in the 1990s
it exceeds 0:3. Restricting  =  ( = 0), so that byt follows an exact AR(1) as in the
example in section 3.1, gives similar results.
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generally insignicant. By imposing bT = 0 we can therefore infer a lower
bound ! on the globalization parameter ! by associating badj = (1  !).
Our estimates of the business-cycle adjusted risk sharing coe¢ cient con-
vey a clear message: given the rise in the long-term variance ratio, risk
sharing must have increased; badj drops from 0:7 in 1960-80 to 0:5 for the
globalization period as a whole and continues its decline in the 1990s with
a drop to below 0:4 and the decline from each period to the next appears
signicant. If we impose bT = 0, the values implied for ! suggest that the
fraction of permanent idiosyncratic risk insured at the international level
must have increased from 30% to at least 60% in the 1990s. These are the
headline numbers we emphasized in the introduction and that underscore
the considerable magnitude of the increase in risk sharing that has been
masked by the international decline in business cycle volatility.
By way of comparison, the last row of table 3 reports results for the
United States. As is apparent, US federal states do not have a systematically
lower long-term variance ratio that could help explain why the estimates of
b are so much lower in regional than in international data. While this
is not the central part of our analysis, we emphasize this point, because it
implies that the conclusions that a vast literature has drawn from comparing
estimates of b across space remain una¤ected: when compared to the U.S.,
there remains a clear lack of risk sharing at the international level. But our
results here suggest that the gap between how much risk is shared within a
country and between countries has, though not closed, so clearly narrowed
substantially.
Before we conclude, we now turn to an examination of the role of changes
in the synchronization and volatility of international business cycles for con-
sumption correlations.
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5.3 Implications for consumption correlations
The rst part of table 4 presents cross-country averages of international
consumption and output growth correlations for both the U.S. and for the
OECD countries  for the latter again for the three subperiods. As is ap-
parent, consumption correlations for the U.S. are not that much higher than
international correlations. Both international and regional correlations in-
dicate a signicant lack of risk sharing in that they are much lower than
unity. In addition, in both data sets output correlations are actually higher
than consumption correlations. This is the quantity puzzle that, as we have
argued, limits the interpretability of consumption correlations as a measure
of risk sharing. Still, one should expect that nancial integration would
have led to an increase in international consumption correlations. In table
4 however, there is clearly no evidence of such an increase. Very much as in
the case of the risk sharing regression, changes in world business cycles may
have o¤set the e¤ect of nancial integration on international consumption
correlations.
Our partial insurance framework implies a simple factor structure for
domestic and international consumption that also allows us to explore the
impact of changes in business cylce volatility on international consumption
correlations:
264 ct
ct
375 =
264 1 0
! 1  !
375
264 yPt
yPt
375 =
264 1 0
1 1  !
375
264 yPt
yPt  yPt
375 ,
(12)
where yPt can be interpreted as the common factor in domestic and
foreign consumption growth. To the extent that the global and country-
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specic factors are orthogonal, (12) implies that changes in consumption
correlations can come about either due to changes in the variance of common
relative to idiosyncratic shocks to yPt or due to changes in !.
Now assume that between the pre-globalization and the globalization
periods, the variance of the the common relative to the idiosyncratic factors
has changed so that

var(yPt )
var(byPt )

t>t0
= (1 + )

var(yPt )
var(byPt )

t<t0
for some point in time t0. Under the assumption that ! has remained the
same between periods, Forbes and Rigobon (2001) have shown, that the
correlation coe¢ cient implied by for the period after the change can be
written as
imp = t<t0
s
1 + 
1 + 2
t<t0
, (13)
where 
t<t0
is the correlation coe¢ cient from the period before the change
in var(yPt )=var(byPt ). Hence, if the correlation coe¢ cient imp implied by
(13) and the one actually observed in the period after t0 are signicantly
di¤erent from each other, then ! must have changed.
In the lower part of table 4 we rst present the ratio of the standard
deviations of the common (yPt ) and idiosyncratic (byPt ) factors for the
three subperiods. After 1980, this ratio seems to have fallen considerably,
from 0:38 in 1960-80 to 0:33 in 1980-2000 to 0:14 in 1990-2000. Recall from
our previous results that the variance of the country-specic trend growth
factor has actually fallen itself. The results here imply that the volatility of
the global trend growth factor has declined even more.
The last row of table 4 gives the implied correlations, imp for 1980-
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2000 and 1990-2000.18 In view of the downward trend in the variance ratio
between global and country-specic factors, it is not surprising that we nd
imp declines over time. If the entire post-1980 period is considered, the
implied and actual correlations appear still quite similar. However, they
clearly start to diverge after 1990: whereas the implied correlation drops
markedly there is almost no decline in the correlation obtained from actual
post-1990 data. In the context of our model here, this can only be explained
through an o¤setting increase in !.
The stylized fact that the variability of global output shocks has de-
creased during the globalization period is now well-documented (see Kose,
Otrok and Whiteman (2003, 2005) and Heathcote and Perri (2004)). Ab-
sent nancial globalization, these changes in world business cycles should
actually have lowered consumption correlations. The fact that consumption
correlations have remained roughly constant after 1980 is therefore quite
in line with the theoretical proposition that nancial globalization should
increase consumption correlations ceteris paribus.
6 Conclusion
Consumption based measures of international risk sharing seem to have
remained una¤ected by more than two decades of nancial globalization.
Whereas economic theory would suggest that the country-specic compo-
nent of consumption volatility (conditional on output) should decrease and
international consumption correlations should increase with nancial inte-
gration, both measures have remained approximately constant after 1980
and throughout the 1990s. In this paper, we have put forward an expla-
18These implied correlations are strictly valid only if yP and byP are orthogonal,
an assumption that we nd reasonable to maintain for the average country and that is
conrmed in the data.
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nation of this puzzle by arguing that the global decline in the volatility of
output has almost o¤set the impact of nancial globalization on consump-
tion.
In our analysis, the distinction between permanent and transitory uctu-
ations in output and income is central, because consumption reacts primarily
to permanent shocks and because it is plausibly much harder for countries
to insure against permanent than against transitory uctuations. Based
on OECD data from 1960-2000, we show that the fraction of permanent
country-specic risk that gets shared internationally through world nan-
cial markets has increased substantially, from less than 30 percent before
1980 to more than 60 percent during the 1990s.
We identify two reasons why basic measures of risk sharing have not
picked up this trend, both of which are related to the by now well-researched
global decline in business cycle volatility: rst, the country-specic com-
ponent of output growth has become less volatile for the average OECD
economy. This decline in volatility is, however, less pronounced for the per-
manent components of output than it is at business cycle frequencies. Since
country-specic consumption growth reacts primarily to permanent idiosyn-
cratic shocks, its volatility conditional on current country-specic output
growth increases. This instance of Deatons (1992) paradox will induce an
upward bias in risk sharing regressions, o¤setting the e¤ects of nancial
globalization.
Secondly, the global component in permanent output uctuations has
also become less volatile which implies that international consumption cor-
relations should have fallen ceteris paribus. The fact that they have stayed
approximately constant is therefore consistent with the view that nancial
integration tends to increase consumption correlations.
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Virtually all indicators of nancial integration tell us that nancial glob-
alization is happening. So far, consumption-based measures were an excep-
tion to this rule. This is troubling, because the very raison dêtre of nancial
markets is the allocation of consumption risk and any assessment of the wel-
fare benets of nancial integration will ultimately amount to a statement
about consumption. It is therefore crucial to identify the factors that may
have led international consumption comovements to defy the predictions of
a wide class of theoretical models. To our knowledge, the results in this pa-
per provide the rst account of these factors: once we control for changes in
international business cycles, consumption growth rates have become more
correlated and relative consumption growth has become more independent
from relative output growth just as theory would predict.
We emphasize that this nding has nothing to say about whether the
changes in international business cycles that we and others have identied
over the globalization period could not by themselves be the outcome of
nancial or trade integration. Clearly, there are good theoretical reasons to
believe that this may indeed be the case.
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Appendix: Construction of permanent GDP-values
We can rewrite the denition of Y Pt = (1 R)
P1
k=0R
kE (Yt+k) as
Y Pt = (1 R)Yt
"
1 +
1X
k=1
RkE

1 +
Yt+k   Yt
Yt
#
and we can think of
P1
k=1R
kE

1 +
Yt+k Yt
Yt

as the percentage of total
output that is transitory and can therefore be associated with the business
cycle component. Since business cycles account for a small percentage of the
level of GDP, we can use Yt+k YtYt  log Yt+k   log Yt to obtain the log-linear
approximation:
Y Pt  (1 R)Yt
"
1 +
1X
k=1
RkE (1 + log Yt+k   log Yt)
#
= (1 R)Yt
"
1 +
1
1 R   1 +
1X
k=1
RkE (log Yt+k   log Yt)
#
= (1 R)Yt
"
1
1 R +
1X
k=1
Rk
kX
l=1
E (yt+k+l)
#
,
where yt = log Yt.
Using that
1X
k=1
Rk
kX
l=1
yt+k+l =
1
1 R
1X
k=1
Rkyt+k,
we obtain
Y Pt  (1 R)Yt
"
1
1 R +
1
1 R
1X
k=1
RkE (yt+k)
#
= Yt
"
1 +
1X
k=1
RkE (yt+k)
#
and therefore with yt = log Yt
yPt = log

Y Pt
  yt + 1X
k=1
RkE (yt+k) = (1 R)
1X
k=1
RkE (yt+k) = y
P
t .
We follow Crucini (1999) in comparing two alternative specications for
the permanent components of home and foreign output. First, we consider
a univariate AR(1) process in growth rates of home and foreign output.
ykt = kykt 1 + vkt and y

t = 
yt 1 + v

t .
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While this specication implicitly assumes that there are no spillovers
between home and foreign output, we also consider a VAR specication in
output growth rates. Under the null of our model, aggregate consumption
should be a su¢ cient statistic for expected future levels of output. We
therefore follow the methodology by Campbell and Shiller (1989) and, be-
sides home and foreign output growth, also include (relative) consumption
as an endogenous state. We then estimate the VAR
xt = Axt 1+"t.
where xt =

ykt y

t ck   ct
0
and A is the 3 3 coe¢ cient matrix.
Using the approximation derived above we write the relative permanent
levels of output as
yPt   yPt  ykt   yt +Et
( 1X
l=1
ykt+l  yt+l
(1 + r)k
)
.
To construct the relative permanent values yp   yP from the VAR-
process, we use the Hansen-Sargent prediction formula to get
Et
( 1X
l=1
ykt+l  yt+l
(1 + r)k
)
= h0

A
1 + r
 
I  1
1 + r
A
 1
xt,
where h0 =

1  1 0 . In the case of the AR(1)-process we obtain a
similar expression in which A =

k 0
0 

.
The results reported in the main text, are based on values of yP   yP
constructed with the real interest rate, r, set to 0:02. We provide the results
from a battery of robustness checks in an extended version of this appendix
(available from the authors upon request), where we allow r to vary across a
wide range of di¤erent values and also across countries. Our results remain
unchanged by these exercises.
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Table 1: Basic risk sharing regressions
United States OECD
1960-90 1960-1980 1980-2000 1990-2000
Estimate of b
0.16 0.79 0.89 0.85
(4.6) (19.45) (10.22) (6.27)
NOTES: Panel regressions of the form ckt  ct = b(ykt  yt ) +  + k + "kt
where ; k and "kt are the constant term, the country (region) xed e¤ect and the residual
term respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based on the weighted least squares
procedure described in the main text.
Table 2: Sharing of permanent and transitory idiosyncratic risk
Specication United States OECD
for y  y (1960-90) 1960-80 1980-2000 1990-2000
Permanent component: bP
AR(1) 0.08 0.57 0.42 0.30
(3.18) (15.53) (7.42) (2.71)
VAR(1) 0.04 0.58 0.43 0.19
(1.52) (12.53) (5.84) (1.66)
Transitory component: bT
AR(1) 0.01 -0.40 -0.28 0.07
(0.08) (-3.69) (-2.93) (0.41)
VAR(1) 0.16 0.26 0.14 0.20
(3.23) (3.13) (1.33) (1.54)
NOTES: Panel regressions of the form ckt  ct = bP (ykPt  yPt ) + + k + "kt
and ckt  ct = bT (ykTt  yTt ) +  + k + "kt where ; k and "kt are the
constant term, the country (region) xed e¤ect and the residual term respectively. Numbers in
parentheses are t-statistics based on the weighted least squares procedure described in the main
text. The rst column identies which specication for y  y was used in the
construction of permanent and transitory components.
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Table 3: Business cycle volatility and risk sharing regressions
Business cycle Trend Long-Run Implied degree of
volatility volatility variance ratio globalization
var(by)1=2 var(byP )1=2  = var(byP )var(by) badj = b=
OECD
1960-80 0:028 0:030 1:14 (0:03) 0:70 (0:03)
1980-2000 0:020 0:027 1:80 (0:06) 0:50 (0:02)
1990-2000 0:017 0:025 2:16 (0:22) 0:39 (0:05)
United States
1960-90 0:034 0:042 1:56 (0:02) 0:10 (0:005)
NOTES: The table presents the impact of changes in business cycle and long-run volatility
(var(by) and var(byP ) respectively) on the risk sharing coe¢ cient. Calculations of permanent
components byP based on the VAR. For the calculation of badj = b= the estimates of b
from table 1 were used. Standard errors(in parentheses) reported were obtained as follows: we
repeatedly estimated the panel, dropping the observations for one country or region at a time.
The respective statistics was then re-calculated and stored. This procedure gives us 22 (or 50
for the U.S. without Washington D.C.) di¤erent realizations of each the three parameters. The
standard errors reported are the standard deviations over these 22 (50) realizations. For further
details see section 5.2.
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Table 4: Intl consumption correlations and nancial globalization
United States OECD
1960-90 1960-1980 1980-2000 1990-2000
Data
corr(c;c) 0.54 0.35 0.34 0.31
corr(y;y) 0.78 0.47 0.52 0.60
Variability of global relative to country-specic component
and implied international consumption correlations
var(yP )
var(byP ) 0.38 0.33 0.14
imp  0.33 0.23
NOTES: Reported correlations are the cross-sectional (across countries or US states) aver-
ages of the correlations of consumption/output growth rates with the respective world aggregate.
imp = 

(1 + )
 
1 + 2
 11=2
, where  is the correlation between consumption
growth rates from the preceding subperiod. and  is the percentage change between successive
periods in the ratio var(yP )=var(byP ).
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Figure 1: Dynamic response of output to a permanent shock. Case 1:
immediate adjustment,  = 1:
Figure 2: Dynamic response of output to a permanent shock. Case 2:
gradual adjustment,  > 1:
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